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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that involved in the D'Anna case presents the most workable approach to
the problem for the benefit of all concerned.2 7  Without the benefit of
the statute and without access to some evidence of negligence the plain-
tiff faces the difficulty illustrated here.2 3
North Carolina has not considered the problem directly, and has no
explicit statutory provision.29  If the case applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur where injuries were sustained by a guest is held not to be
controlling,"° the policy of the statutory provision as to dangerous flying
may afford the plaintiff some evidence of negligence. 31
WALTER LEE HORTON, JR.
Libel-Special Damages
The law of libel is an area of the law which at the present time is
fraught with confusion in this jurisdiction.
Some of this confusion in North Carolina and elsewhere may be
attributed to the fact that the common law distinguishes between that
defamation which is oral and that which is written. Originally the
common law courts took no jurisdiction over defamatory utterances, i.e.,
spoken statements calculated to detract in a substantial way from the
esteem in which a person is held in the community. The ecclesiastical
courts took them under their jurisdiction, regarding them as sins, and
dealt with them accordingly. As these spiritual courts began to lose
2Art. I-A Maryland Code § 9 (1951) as applied in D'Anna v. United States,
181 F. 2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950), provides that the owner of any aircraft damaging
property or injuring persons in ascent, descent, or flight shall be prima facie liable
in the absence of contributory negligence of the person involved or unless the air-
craft is used without the consent, express or implied, of the owner. This statute
provides the plaintiff a way to the jury as contrasted with the futility of the plain-
tiff's position in the Williams case. It does not burden the aircraft industry with
absolute liability, but at the same time affords the plaintiff protection.
"8 These problems are set out and discussed fully in Simpson, Use of Aircraft
Accident Investigation Information in Actions for Damages, 17 J. AiR L. 283
(1950). As to preparation for trial see Finley, Trial Technique in Aircraft Acci-
dent Cases, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 809 (1953), in which the author points out the over-
whelming ignorance of most attorneys in the intricacies of obtaining, evaluating,
and presenting evidence in aircraft litigation. As was indicated in Williams v.
United States, 115 F. Supp. 386 (N. D. Fla. 1952), where military aircraft are in-
volved recourse may be had to Congress for legislative relief. For some of the
difficulties involved in obtaining Congressional relief where the judiciary offers
none see Gellhorn and Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims against the
United States, 55 Cok. L. REv. 1 (1955).
2 Section 5 of the Uniform Aviation Act was adopted by North Carolina in
1927, as N. C. GEN. STAT. § 63-14 (1943). It was repealed in 1947 by c. 1069, § 3
of Session Laws of 1947. This statute is identical with that involved in the Praylou
and Prentiss cases cited in footnote 17 supra. This statute imposed strict liability
under precisely the same conditions as the Maryland statute set out in footnote 27
supra raises a prima facie presumption.
I " Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. 2d 442 (1943). See Note, 28 N. C.
L. REv. 432 (1950).
3 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 63-18 (1953) makes it a misdemeanor to drop any object
from an aircraft other than water or loose sand.
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their power, tort actions for slander began to creep into the common law
courts. Thus arose a conflict over jurisdiction, which led the common
law courts to hold that oral defamation was a spiritual matter to be dealt
with by the spiritual court unless "temporal" damages could be proved.'
However, as the common law courts strengthened their position, they
assumed jurisdiction over three classes of oral defamation declaring that
these were of such serious character that malice and temporal damages
would be conclusively presumed. These three favored classes were oral
charges (1) imputing the commission of a crime, (2) imputing a loathe-
some disease, or (3) tending to prejudice one in his trade, profession, or
calling.2 Modern statutes have added a fourth class to this group.
3
It was not until much later, after the introduction of printing, that
a separate set of rules was worked ont for written and printed defama-
tion by the Court of Star Chamber. With the abolition of the Star
Chamber, jurisdiction over written and printed defamation passed to
the common law courts. All written or printed statements tending to
injure one's reputation and expose him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule
were considered defamatory and actionable without the necessity of prov-
ing special damages. Perhaps there are three reasons why proof of
special damages was not required in cases of written defamation: (1)
originally, written defamation was a crime as well as a tort, (2) it was
considered much more serious to put down deliberately on paper a lasting
memorial of a lie against a person's good reputation, and (3) there was
no jurisdictional conflct over these actions.
4
Therefore, at common law oral defamations were divided into two
groups-those which came within the favored classes, and all others.
The former were called slander per se, i.e., actionable without proof of
special damages. The latter were called slander per quod, i.e., actionable
only with allegation and proof of special damages. Within the favored
classes, constituting slander per se, it made no difference whether the
spoken words were slanderous on their face or whether resort to ex-
trinsic evidence was necessary to show that the oral statements were
slanderous. On the other hand, libelous statements were not separated
into classes. Any written or printed statements that were defamatory were
actionable without proof of special damage. Thus it is obvious that the
phrase "slander per se" merely had reference to the three favored classes
which were actionable in themselves, and that it did not mean slander "on
its face" as one might use the term "per se" today. As libel was not
divided into classes which required proof of special damages and classes
PROSSER, TORTS 793-799 (1941); McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 415-419 (1935) ; Note,
14 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1925).
2 PROSSER, TORTS 793-799 (1941); McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 415-419 (1935).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 99-4 (1953). (Dealing with charges of incontinency against
an innocent woman).
' Supra, note 2.
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which did not, there was no place in the law for such a corresponding
phrase as "libel per se." Any libelous statement was actionable in
itself. However-and herein lies the root of the confusion today-the
courts did begin to use the phrase "libel per se," but they used it simply
to distinguish between written or printed statements which were clearly
libelous on their face and those in which resort to extrinsic evidence was
necessary in order to reveal their defamatory meanings. Their use of
the phrase carried no implication with respect to special damages.6
The courts of the United States accepted the common law rule that
any libel was actionable without the necessity of pleading and proving
special damages, and in the minority of the American jurisdictions this
is the rule today, not only as to written or printed publications which
are defamatory upon their face, but also as to those which require ex-
trinsic evidence to establish their defamatory meaning.0 However, a
greater number of courts hold that where extrinsic evidence is necessary
to establish the defamatory meaning, libel is not actionable without proof
of special damages, i.e., if the words are not libelous "per se" (on their
face), they are not actionable without proof of special damages.7 This
majority rule clearly is the product of confusion. It differs from the
corresionding rule of slander in only one respect-the difference between
the meaning of "slander per se" and libel "per se." The courts have
tripped over their own ambiguous device, confused the dual use of
"per se," and, in their confusion, imported the concept of special dam-
ages from the field of slander into the field of libel. An illustration will
point out the difference in the two views. If the written or printed pub-
lication stated that X was a Negro, when in fact X was a white man, the
minority would and do hold that the publication is libelous and actionable
without proof of special damages even though the publication is not
.I.PROSSER, TORTS 793-799 (1941); POLLOcic, TORTS 238-239 (12th ed. 1923);
9CCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 415-419 (1935) ; NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL §§ 5, 6, 20,
21 (4th ed. 1924) ; Note, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1925) ; Note, MicH. L. REV. 253
(1939).
' SMITH AND PROSSER, CASES ON TORTS 1022 (1952); Merchants' Ins. Co. v.
Buckner, 98 Fed. 222 (6th Cir. 1899) ; Ervin v. Record Pub. Co., 154 Cal. 79, 97
P. 21 (1908); Hughes v. Samuels Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N. W. 589 (1916);
Courier Journal Co. v. Noble, 251 Ky. 527, 65 S. W. 2d 703 (1933) ; Sydney v.
MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926); Marr
v. Putnam, 196 Ore. 1, 246 P. 2d 509 (1952) ; Reiman v. Pacific Development Soc.,
132 Ore. 82, 284 P. 575 (1930).
7 SMITH AND PROSSER, CASES ON TORTS 1025 (1952); Rose v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, 213 F. 2d 227 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F. 2d 46
(8th Cir. 1951) ; Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P. 2d 860 (1941) ; Shaw
Cleaners and Dyers, Inc., v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N. W. 231
(1932) ; Jerald v. Houston, 124 Kan. 657, 261 P. 851 (1927) ; Del Rico Co. v. New
Mexican, Inc., 56 N. M. 538, 246 P. 2d 206 (1953) ; Wiley v. Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co., 106 Okla. 52, 233 P. 224 (1924) ; Lana v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618,
59 P. 2d 753 (1936). Also see dissent in Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub.
Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926).
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libelous on its face, or libel "per se."8  On the other hand, the majority
would hold that as the publication is not libelous on its face and as the
defamatory meaning is not shown until the plaintiff proves that he is a
white man, the publication is not actionable without proof of special
damages. 9
It is impossible to determine accurately North Carolina's position on
the question prior to 1937. Oddly enough, only one case, Harrison v.
Garrett, arose in this state prior to that year in which the issue was
directly raised. 10 Perhaps this is due to the fact that the definition of
libel is so broad that practically all defamatory publications prompting
suits are libelous on their face. In that case the defendant did not raise
the question until on appeal. Instead of deciding the point, the court
said, "The defect alleged in this case is that the matter contained in the
letter is not libelous per se and that the plaintiff does not allege special
damages. If the words of the letter are not libelous per se and could
only become actionable if special damages be alleged, the complaint, if
there has been a failure to allege special damages, would only be a de-
fective statement of a cause of action as distinguished from the statement
of a defective cause of action, and the defect was waived or cured when
the defendant answered the complaint."" Another opportunity to decide
the issue did not present itself until 34 years later.'2  In the cases in
which the question was not directly presented during the intervening
period, the court repeatedly used the phrase "libel per se,"' Is but since the
point was not directly in issue in these cases, the court apparently did
not think it necessary to render any definitive decision. As a result the
question lay in doubt for years, the assumption being that the common
law rules would apply.' 4
In 1937 the controversial Flake case' 5 was decided. Speaking as if
Upton v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900) ; Flood v.
News and Courier Co., 71 S. C. 112, 50 S. E. 637 (1905).
o Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P. 2d 860 (1941). However, if this
statement were spoken instead of written, all jurisdictions would hold that as it is
not within one of the favored classes of slander per se, the statement is not action-
able without proof of special damages. PRossEm, TORTS 798-807 (1941) ; McCoR-
mICIc, DAmAGES 415-419 (1935); Deese v. Collins, 191 N. C. 749, 133 S. E. 92
(1926).
10132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594 (1903).
SId. at 177, 43 S. E. at 596.
12 Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1937).
" Davis v. Askin's Retail Stores, 211 N. C. 551, 191 S. E. 33 (1937) ; Harrel
v. Goerch, 209 N. C. 741, 184 S. E. 489 (1936); Oates v. Wachovia Bank and
Trust Co., 205 N. C. 14, 169 S. E. 869 (1933) ; Pentuff v. Park, 194 N. C. 146,
138 S. E. 616 (1927) ; Hedgepeth v. Coleman, 183 N. C. 309, 111 S. E. 517 (1922) ;
Hall v. Hall, 179 N. C. 571, 103 S. E. 136 (1920) ; Brown v. Elm City Lumber Co.,
167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961 (1914).
"" Wettach, Recent Developments in Newspaper Libel, 7 N. C. L. REv. 3 (1928);
Brandis and Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North Carolina,
31 N. C. L. REv. 249, 269 (19S3).
' 0 Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1937).
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it had been the law in this state from time immemorial, the court said,
"In publications which are libelous per quod the innuendo and special
damages must be alleged and proved."' 6 Here, for the first time in
North Carolina, the court directly stated that special damages must be
alleged and proved if a publication is not libelous "per se" (on its face).
This case divides libel into three classes: (1) publications which are
obviously defamatory and which are termed libel per se; (2) publications
which are susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which is
defamatory and the other is not; and (3) publications which are not
defamatory without the aid of explanatory circumstances and which are
called libel per quod. If the publication constitutes libel per se, special
damages need not be alleged and proved, but if it constitutes libel per
quod, they must be. The status of the second class is left somewhat in
doubt. Prior to this case it was held that if the publication were sus-
ceptible of two interpretations, one defamatory and the other not, the
jury should decide the meaning understood, and the court said nothing
about special damages.17 The Flake case seems to indicate that special
damages need not be alleged if the complaint alleges that the defamatory
meaning was intended and understood.' 8
The only North Carolina authority relied on for holding the special
damages must be alleged and proved in publications which are libelous
per quod was Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co.,19 a slander case
concerned with the question of whether the charge came within one of
the four classes of slander per se. Not only is this a slander case, but
the court also clearly indicated that extrinsic evidence could be used to
bring the charge within one of the classes of slander per se, eliminating
the necessity of proving special damages. As a slander case, it would
seem not to be controlling in a libel decision. Additionally it would seem
that its use in the Flake case as supporting authority for the proposition
that in libel special damages must be alleged and proved where extrinsic
evidence is necessary, was a result of a misinterpretation of the deci-
sion.20 It is also worthy of note that the Flake case cites the same out-
side authority for its distinction between libel per se and per quod that
the Oates case cites for its distinction between slander per se and per
quod. That authority is a slander case also.
21
So it is seen that the North Carolina court has lost sight of the dis-
1 Id. at 785, 195 S. E. at 58.
1 Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 205 N. C. 14, 169 S. E. 869 (1933);
Castelloe v. Phelps, 198 N. C. 454, 152 S. E. 163 (1930).
1" Brandis and Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North
Carolina, 31 N. C. L. REv. 249, 269 (1953).
1205 N. C. 14, 169 S. E. 869 (1933).
10 Brandis and Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North Caro-
lina, 31 N. C. L. REv. 249, 269 (1953).
21 Walker v. Tucker, 220. Ky. 362, 295 S. W. 138 (1927).
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tinction between "slander per se" (charges within the four classes action-
able in themselves without proof of special damages) and libel "per se"
(on its face) and has brought the special damage concept over from the
field of slander into the field of libel. Instead of the original rule that
the existence of damages is conclusively presumed from the publication
of the libel, North Carolina now divides libel into two broad classes.
As to the first, libel per se, the original rule is still applied; but as to the
second, libel per quod, the existence of damages is no longer presumed,
but proof thereof is required. Why? Because long ago a judge used
the phrase "libel per se" simply to indicate that the publication was
libelous without need of extrinsic evidence. Had he simply said "this
publication is not actionable without extrinsic evidence to show its
defamatory meaning," perhaps the confusion would never have arisen.
In 1928 it was pointed out in this Law Review that the confusion existed
in other states.22  It is difficult to determine whether the court in the
Flake case was merely confused, whether it deliberately adopted what it
considered the best view, or both.
Since the Flake case, there has been only one North Carolina decision
having any implications as to this problem a.2  This case arose on de-
murrer to test the sufficiency of a complaint, and, while not decisive of
the issue, it seems that the court clearly recognized that publication of
any libel is actionable in itself-irrespective of whether any special dam-
age has been caused to plaintiff's reputation or otherwise. At least it
cites authority to that effect. On the other hand, it is a sound presump-
tion that the court was aware of the Flake case; especially since it cites
it for its broad definition of libel "per se."
Thus it appears that the law in North Carolina as regards libel re-
mains confused. It seems that the clarity expressed in the Flake case
was short lived. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the court, in
subsequent decisions, will follow the majority rule clearly set out in the
Flake case, or adopt the minority rule as indicated by the court in the
Kindley case.
Prior to the Flake case, the court had consistently allowed extrinsic
evidence to show that spoken charges were within one of the four cate-
gories of slander per se without requiring allegation and proof of special
damages, although on their face they were not within any of them. 24 As
to whether the court will require allegation and proof of special damages
in such cases today by analogy to the rule laid down in the Flake case,
" Wettach, Recent Developments in Newspaper Libel, 7 N. C. L. REv. 3 (1928).
.Kindley v. Privette, 241 N. C. 140, 84 S. E. 2d 660 (1954)."2 See for example: Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 205 N. C. 14, 169
S. E. 869 (1933) ; Hurley v. Lovett, 199 N. C. 793, 155 S. E. 875 (1930) ; Castelloe
v. Phelps, 198 N. C. 454, 152 S. E. 163 (1930); Simmons v. Morse, 51 N. C. 6
(1858) ; Watts v. Greenlee, 13 N. C. 115 (1829).
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quaere. A case closely following the Flake case implies that it would
not be necessary.25
On the surface the majority rule may seem to be a good one. How-
ever, if a departure from the common law is deemed desirable, instead
of bringing the special damage concept over from slander into libel, it
would seem far better to abolish the special damage concept altogether
in the field of defamation. There was no legal reason nor logic for the
original common law rule that in all cases of slander special damages had
to be alleged and proved. There was even less reason for making ex-
ceptions as to the three narrow categories of slander per se. All defama-
tion should either be actionable or not actionable. When proof of special
damages is required where extrinsic evidence is necessary to show the
defamatory meaning, the court is, in effect, holding that the defamatory
meaning was understood only by those who understood the innuendo and
knew the circumstances, and that this is not sufficient to make it action-
able unless the plaintiff has suffered pecuniary damages because of it.
Yet it is among those who understood the defamatory meaning that
plaintiff's reputation has been damaged-and it is for damages to reputa-
tion that an action for defamation lies.
ALEXANDER H. BARNES.
Conflict of Laws-Residence or Domicile-Non-Resident
Motorist Statutes
In a recent decision' the defendant was served with summons under
the North Carolina Non-Resident Motorist Statute.2 He moved to set
aside the service of process as invalid on the ground that at the time of
the accident he was a resident of North Carolina.3
It appeared from the facts that some time prior to November, 1952,
the defendant was assigned to active duty in the armed services at Camp
Lejeune, near Jacksonville, North Carolina. The accident occurred in
January 1954, and nine days later the defendant was transferred to
" Scott v. Harrison, 215 N. C. 427, 2 S. E. 2d 1 (1939).
'Hart v. Queen City Coach Co., 241 N. C. 389, 85 S. E. 2d 319 (1955).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (1953). All forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia have now enacted non-resident motorist statutes. For a complete list of
citations as of 1947 see, Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (W. D. Iowa 1947).
' Unless otherwise provided, it is the residence of the defendant at the time of
the accident which controls in the application of statutes authorizing constructive
service on non-resident motorists. Rompza v. Rucas, 337 Il1. App. 106, 85 N. E. 2d
467 (1949) (One of the basic jurisdictional facts is the non-residence of the de-
fendant at the time of the accident.) ; Netter v. King, 331 Ill. App. 619, 73 N. E.
2d 798 (1947) ; Welsh v. Ruopp, 228 Iowa 70, 289 N. W. 760 (1940) (Non-resi-
dence at the time of the accident cannot be assumed.) ; Bigham v. Foor, 201 N. C.
14, 158 S. E. 548 (1931). Contra: Hendershot v. Ferkel, 144 Ohio St. 112, 56
N. E. 2d 205 (1944) (Act applies to residents who subsequently became non-resi-
dents or who conceal their whereabouts.)
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